Abstract
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We find that firms with weak corporate governance and less managerial ownership are more likely to award a higher dollar amount and number of perquisites to executives. Our evidence also shows that firms facing less product market competition also award larger perquisites to their executives, a finding consistent with the proposition that a lack of real market competition may increase the probability of abusive practices. Among the various types of perquisites, we find: air and long distance travel; equity related perquisites (not included in stock options or other equity compensation); legal, financial, and tax services; and, financial perquisites unrelated to savings or retirement, are more likely to be consumed by executives of firms characterized by weak governance. We also find evidence that perquisites may be rewards for productivity, which suggests a dual role for perquisite awards.
Our study is motivated in part by two important studies that examine the motives underlying perquisite consumption. Yermack (2006) presents evidence that firms disclosing the private use of corporate jets during the period 1993-2002 experience negative market revaluations.
Yermack also finds the common stocks of those same firms tend to underperform subsequent to the disclosure compared to matching firms with no private jet use. Rajan and Wulf (2006) , on the other hand, in a study of 300 firms sampled from the years 1986 to 1999 conclude that executives tend to use corporate jets in a fashion consistent with enhancing "productivity," not executive excesses. Prior to the new SEC disclosure requirement, perquisite awards were buried in the "all other compensation" category. The statutory change allows us to delve into a more comprehensive menu of perquisite award, specifically on both individual components and total perquisite consumption. We accomplish this by focusing on the number, type and amount of executive perquisites and how they vary by executive type. We are one of the first studies to take advantage of the depth and breadth of expanded disclosure provided by the change in financial reporting rules.
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As a consequence we are able to use the expanded disclosures to provide further evidence on the motivations behind the awarding of perquisites as additional compensation.
We also expand the literature on perquisite consumption by presenting evidence on whether product market competition motivates corporate actions. Karuna (2007) provided evidence that three dimensions of product market competition: price-cost margin, market size and entry costs influence management incentives. Our paper adds to the literature by addressing whether product market competition serves as a disciplining mechanism in another management context, the awarding and consumption of perquisites.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of extant hypotheses regarding the determinants of perquisite consumption and the explanatory variables we use in our investigation in Section II. Section III describes the sample selection procedure and presents descriptive statistics. Section IV presents our empirical findings and Section V concludes.
II. POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF PERQUISITE CONSUMPTION Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Perquisite Consumption
A manager with a fractional equity stake in a firm does not bear the full cost of his perquisite consumption but reaps the full benefits. Perquisite consumption may therefore be a form of self-dealing, and may be indicative of the severity of vertical agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . 1 If perquisite consumption is a product of agency problems, internal and external factors that may act to reduce excessive perquisite consumption include those features of the corporate governance system which incentivize and discipline managers. Internal governance measures include: 1) shareholder voting privileges, 2) various takeover defense provisions, 3)
1 Yermack (2006) suggests a spillover effect may also emerge when perquisites result in no added real managerial productivity. He suggests that excess perquisites may foster low morale if employees believe management is taking advantage of perquisite consumption for personal gain and hence may result in a reduction in productivity overall.
5 factors related to the election and organization of the board and 4) alignment of executive and shareholder interests via shareholdings. External governance pressures include: 1) the markets in which a firm buys and sells (e.g. the level of competition faced by the firm), 2) the institutional and concentrated shareholder pressure, and 3) the market for corporate control.
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We first examine internal governance mechanisms. First, we examine the corporate governance/shareholder rights index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003) , which is an aggregation of factors characterizing corporate governance and shareholder rights, labeled as the GIM index.
3 Specifically, the index includes characteristics that Gompers et al. (2003) we expect to observe more perquisite consumption when governance is weak, and hence expect a positive relation between GIM and perquisite consumption.
A complementary indicator of governance not accounted for in the GIM index is the independence of the board of directors. 4 Gillan (2006) refers to the board of directors as "..the lynchpin of corporate governance" (p. 385). The primary thesis as it would apply in the context of perquisites is that less independent boards of directors, those that are more likely to be controlled by the CEO, are more prone to allow managers to waste assets. This hypothesis predicts board 6 independence to be inversely related to perquisite consumption. We measure board independence as the ratio of independent (outside) board members to total directors. 5 We obtain these data from the RiskMetrics governance files as well as the proxy statements of the sample companies.
The third variable related to internal governance mechanisms is managerial ownership.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that as the proportion of shares owned by managers increases so does the value of the firm. However, consistent with Morck et al. (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that inside equity ownership is non-linear and that as managerial ownership becomes highly concentrated firm value declines. Our proxy for the alignment of executive and shareholder interests via shareholdings (for instance, Ross, 1973, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 There is mounting evidence regarding the impact of institutional investors on corporate actions (see Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Becht et al., 2009 Another internal governance mechanism that has received increased attention is the founder/founding family. The wealth of the founding family is tied up in the firm thus providing incentives to monitor management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Weisskopf, 2012 an entrenchment effect in founder/founding family firms when internal controls are weak. These weak internal controls lead to more accounting misstatements and fraud than in non-family firms.
The literature is mixed as to whether founder/founding firms incentives are aligned with shareholders or whether the entrenchment effect leads to resource extraction. We therefore do not have a prediction for this variable. We use the measure of founder/founding family ownership from Bagnoli et al. (2008) where the presence of the founder or descendants in management, on the board or among the company's top shareholders is an indicator variable set equal to 1 and 0 otherwise.
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Numerous authors including Hart (1983) , Hermalin (1992) , Schmidt (1997) and Karuna (2007) , Giroud and Mueller (2010) , suggest that product market competition can act as an important disciplining force by driving out bad managerial practices. Karuna (2007) shows that several measures of product market competition influence management incentives. Karuna (2007) uses price-cost margin (Demsetz, 1997) an indicator of product substitutability. More intense competition is predicted to produce a smaller price-cost margin. We follow Karuna (2007) and calculate the price-cost margin as sales less operating costs divided by operating costs, all at the four-digit SIC code level. We expect a negative relation to exist between product substitutability and the amount and level of perquisites if perquisites are consumed as a consequence of an agency problem. The second dimension of competition, market size reflects the demand in a particular industry. If demand is high, less competition may be present and less discipline. We would thus expect a positive relation between market size (measured by industry sales at the four-digit SIC code level) and the amount and number of perquisites. The last dimension of competition is entry costs, which represent the minimal level of investment that must be incurred by new entrants into the industry. If entry costs are high this deters new firms from entering the market. The firms who are currently operating in the market then enjoy lower competition due to the barrier to entry.
We thus expect a positive relation between entry costs (measured by the average of property, plant and equipment by the four-digit SIC code level then weighted by each firm's market share in this industry and the amount) and level of perquisites.
Presence of Potential Agency Problems
Jensen (1986) suggests that when managers have access to excess free cash flow, they may tend to spend it in ways that benefit themselves but which reduce shareholder wealth. Several academic studies provide evidence of the destructive effect that corporate diversification has on firm value (for example, Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Liebeskind and Opler, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996 Shareholders of modern corporations delegate most expenditure decisions to managers.
Companies whose capital is relatively less tangible (i.e., more growth options) may be subject to greater information asymmetry and agency problems as capital providers cannot observe, monitor, and assess spending on and the management of intangibles as easily as tangible assets (see for instance Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver, 1993, 1995; among others) . If the relative contribution of intangibles to the total real capital of firms is correlated with the general presence of agency problems, then we would expect such a measure to be positively related to perquisite consumption. One measure of the relative contribution of intangible assets (e.g., growth opportunities) to a firm's total real capital is book-to-market ratio (BTM).We compute the BTM as the book value of total equity divided by the total market value of equity, and labeled as BTM and is measured at year-end 2005.
Alternative Explanations to Perquisite Consumption
Compensation Policy Fama (1980) suggests that perks may serve to supplement an imperfect compensation policy. Executives may compensate to balance this perceived shortfall in cash compensation by consuming perquisites. In this context, perquisites are not necessarily detrimental to value but act to complete managerial compensation programs. This theory predicts a negative relation between abnormal compensation and the level of perquisites. We follow Yermack (2006) and measure abnormal compensation as the residual value from the regression of the sum of CEO's nonperquisite compensation (salary, bonus and option awards) on the log of firm sales, CEO tenure, size adjusted stock returns and industry effects captured by two digit SIC dummy variables. 8 We label the variable, Abnormal comp.
Managerial Productivity Rajan and Wulf (2006) argue that the firm may benefit by offering perquisites because they are a strategic factor useful in maximizing the productivity of management, and hence are by design part of an optimal compensation policy. The premise is that some perks could enhance the 11 use of an executive's time thereby enhancing productivity. One possible implication of this argument is that more productive executives will receive more perks.
This is similar to the views of Holmstrom (1979) and Smith and Watts (1992) which suggest that higher marginal product decision makers are rewarded with higher compensation.
Under this explanation, we would expect to observe that more productive firms pay greater perquisites and a positive association between productivity and perquisite consumption. We measure corporate productivity using a measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) . The measure assigns an efficiency score to a firm based on inputs (capital and expenses) and outputs (revenue) for the company after accounting for industry effects. 9 We label the variable Efficiency.
Firm Size
Large firms may seek to attract high marginal product managers since such firms have greater resources to manage. If perquisites are a reward for productivity then we would expect large firms to provide greater rewards to a high marginal product manager as compared to a low marginal product manager. As a consequence if paying greater perquisites allows such firms to attract better managers with a higher marginal productivity, we would expect a positive relation between a measure of firm size and perquisite consumption.
Taxes
Disclosure of total compensation provides the IRS with another tool to monitor whether information on a company's tax return is accurate. 10 If disclosure of a perquisite amount is incomplete, as was the case prior to 2006, firms might view perquisite awards as a tax-advantaged way to pay their executives (Rajan and Wulf 2006) . Another possibility of course follows from 9 We thank Peter Demerjian and Sarah McVay for providing us the efficiency score data used in this study.
12 the fact that many perquisites are not taxable income to the executive receiving them. If the marginal tax rate of the executive is positive then the executive will prefer a non-taxable perquisite to receiving the same amount as taxable income, ceteris paribus.
As we are examining a cross-section of firms for the same year, the statutory federal tax rate is the same for all executives however the state tax rates they face will vary depending upon their state of residence. We define the variable state tax as the highest marginal state personal income tax rate for the state in which a company is headquartered. We predict that the higher the marginal tax rate in the state in which a company's headquarters resides, the more executives will prefer perks. The simple reason is tax avoidance since perquisites are not taxable income to the executives.
Managerial Status Frank (1985) argues that individuals are concerned with the social position of the groups to which they belong, and also with their positions within those groups. Rajan and Wulf (2006) argue that to the extent relative status within the firm increases an executive's utility, and to the extent that perquisite levels are positively associated with status, providing perquisites may be a cost-effective way of compensating executives. Simply, the marginal cost to the company of a perquisite award may be less than the marginal cost if the award was made as salary. This would occur if the executive values the marginal perquisite award more highly due to the status it bestows in the eyes of his or her peers.
Further, Frank (1985) and Ranjan and Wulf (2006) suggest that managerial consumption of perquisites is regarded as a measure of status by executives, similar to other potential status proxies such as the size and complexity of the company. If status dictates the demand for perquisites by executives, then at one level perquisite consumption for status purposes is just 13 another manifestation of the presence of an agency problem. Rajan and Wulf (2006) predict that large firms are probably more likely to fall into this category. We employ as a measure of size to capture this effect the total market capitalization of the firm, computed using data from CRSP measured at year end, prior to the release of the proxy statement. We use a log transform of market capitalization in our analyses. the new rules, if the aggregate perquisite award exceeds $10,000, the perquisite must be identified and disclosed. In addition, if the value of a perquisite is the greater of $25,000 or 10% of total perquisites, its value must be disclosed.
III. Data and Descriptive

12
By the new SEC rules, an item is not a perquisite "if it is integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive's duties" (SEC Release 33-8732A), but an item is a perquisite "if it confers a direct or indirect benefit that has a personal aspect, without regard to whether it 11 Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, SEC Release 33-8732A (August 29, 2006) . 12 Prior to the new SEC rules, the SEC required firms to disclose in their proxy statements any perks over $50,000 or 10% of total cash compensation and to identify specifics if each perquisite was 25% of total perquisites value in proxy statements (SEC Release No. 33-6962. see SEC 1992) . These thresholds potentially allowed firms to avoid disclosure through a policy of strategically allocating just less than the thresholds. The new rules establish a minimum threshold amount for reporting perquisites of $10,000. Once reported, each perquisite and its amount have to be identified in subsequent years' proxy statements if the value is more than $25,000 or 10% of the total perquisites. may be provided for some business reason or for the convenience of the company" and "unless it is generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees." (SEC Release 33-8732A).
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The Perquisite Data Extending the window would have allowed firms more time to react to the rule change and ultimately restructure or eliminate perquisite programs.
We collected compensation and perquisite consumption information for the CEO and the five top executives for whom the reporting rules required perquisite data disclosure. Details on 13 The SEC provides the following items as examples of perquisites: "club memberships not used exclusively for business entertainment purposes, personal financial or tax advice, personal travel using vehicles owned or leased by the company, personal travel otherwise financed by the company, personal use of other property owned or leased by the company, housing and other living expenses (including but not limited to relocation assistance and payments for the executive or director to stay at his or her personal residence), security provided at a personal residence or during personal travel, commuting expenses (whether or not for the company's convenience or benefit), and discounts on the company's products or services not generally available to employees on a non-discriminatory basis."
14 RiskMetrics Group purchased the data compilation arm of IRRC in 2006. The arm of RiskMetrics Group which compiles the current data is ISS Governance Services. We accessed the data via the WRDS portal.
perquisite awards are reported in a footnote to the compensation summary table of the proxy statement and include the number of different awards, the sizes of the awards, and how the awards are distributed. We also require that all salary information for the five top executives be reported and that all sample firms comply with the new SEC disclosure rules in preparing their compensation summary tables. This reduced the sample to 645. Thirty-seven companies are excluded for lack of data. There are 608 firms in our final sample. Based upon the Fama-French (1997) industry classifications our sample covers forty-three different industries. Utilities have the highest percentage representation in our sample (67 firms, 11.02 %) while the remainder (not reported) are fairly evenly distributed across the industry groups.
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Descriptive Statistics for Perquisites
We classify perquisite items into 10 broad categories: 16 (1) air and long distance travel expenses, (2) company car and local transportation, (3) entertainment and other extra-curricular activities, (4) personal and family related perquisites that enhance the home/family situation of the executive, (5) severance package and/or special dividend distribution, (6) legal, financial, and tax services, (7) medical allowances and medical expenses paid by the corporation, (8) financial perquisites unrelated to savings or retirement, (9) administrative privileges, and (10) other. Firms sometimes disclose the use of a perquisite item but not the exact dollar amount of the perquisite.
Our sample includes 10 such companies. In such cases we record the perquisite only as having 15 The tabulation is available from the authors upon request. 16 In classifying perquisite items, we exclude non-perquisite items that are included in "All Other Compensation" such as (1) severance/retirement/change-in-control payments, (2) dollar value of life insurance premiums, (3) discounted security purchases (unless generally available), and (4) dollar value of dividends or other earnings paid on stock/options when not factored into the grant date fair value. However, we view tax-gross ups as perquisites and include them in our analysis. The use of "All Other Compensation" as an indicator of total perquisite consumption will overstate the dollar value of perquisites. 16 been paid. Appendix A provides a detailed description of our classification scheme and each perquisite category's sub-components. Table I presents the frequency of use of each perquisite by executive type: CEO, CFO, and the next three most highly compensated executives. We label the latter executives, EA, EB and EC. Approximately 88% of the top five executives receive at least one perquisite item and there is no statistical difference. The most frequent perquisite, which was provided by over 50% of the sample firms, was the provision for legal, financial and tax services (Type 6). In addition to the payment for the preparation of tax returns, this category includes tax gross-ups. The second most frequent type of perquisite, provided by roughly 40% of the sample firms, was the provision of a company car and /or local transportation (Type 2). This category includes payments for leased automobiles, chauffeured automobiles, gasoline and parking. The third and fourth most frequent types of perquisites, provided by roughly 33% of the sample firms each, were the provision for air and long distance travel expenses (Type 1) and personal and family-related perquisites (Type 4).
Type 1 perquisites include access to a corporate jet, travel on commercial airlines, lodging and travel allowances. The least frequent types of perquisite awards were for medical and health benefits and administrative privileges, both provided by less than 7% of the firms in our sample. representing about 4% of their median base line salaries. Although 6% is a minuscule amount of the CEO's salary, if this amount is due to agency problems, then the amount of the expropriation becomes a secondary concern and the material issue is the loss of shareholder wealth.
We examine three alternative but complimentary measures of perquisite consumption: 1) the dollar value of perquisites, 2) the number of different perquisites, and 3) the types of perquisites.
Each measure serves as an indicator of perquisite consumption. The use of three alternative measures allows us to test the robustness of our conclusions to both how perquisites are measured as well as the statistical models employed in our analyses. In addition to observations on the dollar levels of perquisites as highlighted in Table II , we also examine the number of perquisites consumed. Data on the number of perquisite awards are reported in Table III 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Determinants of Perquisite Awards
Governance Related Variables The next three variables are potential disciplining mechanisms that Karuna (2007) examined in relation to managerial incentives. We find the average price-cost margin (Price-cost mrg) for the sample firms is 0.141 which is our measure of product substitutability. The higher the value of this measure the less substitutable the product. The logarithmic value of market size (Mkt size) has an average value of 10.59, which is consistent with that of Karuna (2007) . Our measure of entry costs (Entry cost) has an average value of 3.85 which is significantly smaller than the mean of 7.0 captured by Karuna (2007) suggesting the entry costs in our sample firms are significantly lower.
Variables Pertaining to Alternative Explanation to Perquisites
Panel C of Table III reports statistics related to our alternative explanation and control variables. Jensen (1986) postulated that firms with both high cash flows and low growth (GRW)
were apt to spend the cash in ways that didn't benefit shareholders. We find that 42% of our sample fits into this category. Fama (1980) postulated that if managers view their compensation as imperfect, they will reward themselves with additional compensation. Average abnormal compensation (Abnormalcomp), in our sample equals -$110,000. Note that because we use the universe of the firms contained in the ExecuComp database when estimating this value, the median value for our sample is not zero. The variable, Efficiency was defined by Demerjian et al. (2012) to represent the relative ability of managers to transform inputs into outputs within a given FamaFrench (1998) industry. 17 The range for this variable is 0 to 1 with zero representing the least efficient and 1 the most efficient. In our sample, Efficiency has a mean value of 0.73 suggesting that the managers in our sample firms are on average efficient in the management of company resources. Finally, we find that the marginal state tax rate (State tax) has a mean value of 5% and the median value of the number of business segments in our sample is 3. Market value and the book-to-market ratio (BTM) have mean values of $10,954 (million) and 0.42 respectively.
18 Table IV Each of the models presented in Table V reports the association between our measures of corporate governance and perquisite consumption. In our models the proxy variables representing our alternative explanation are also included. The models are estimated by ordinary least squares 20 methods and robust standard errors are used in the computation of coefficient tests statistics (see Greene, 2008 Entry cost are statistically significant and in the predicted directions. These results taken together suggest that when a firm has a weak governance structure perquisite consumption is higher. The results also show that perquisites may serve another role in the organization. Specifically, perquisites may be a reward for productive managers. In columns (1) through (3), Efficiency is positive and statistically significant suggesting that more efficient managers are rewarded with a higher dollar amount of perquisites. There appears to be a duality involved with perquisite consumption. In firms with weak governance mechanisms, perquisite awards are the result of agency problems, but in the presence of efficient managers the increase in perquisite awards represents a reward for managerial efficiency. We also find Numberofsegs is positive and significant which is problematic and suggests there is some support for the status argument.
Panel B of Table V Inst holdings is no longer significant. Overall, Panel Table V shows that weak governance and weak product market discipline are associated with higher levels of perquisite consumption. But in the face of an efficient manager perquisite consumption increases. Again, the results suggest a dual purpose for perquisite consumption within the organization.
In untabulated results, we divide our sample by size based on total assets. For small firms we find stronger results, governance reduces the level of perquisites to both the CEO and the five top executives. We then compare our current sample to the period before the rule change in an
effort to investigate what impact the rule change had in the post period and find that in the post 21 period, the coefficient on GIM shrinks significantly. This suggests that small firms benefitted most from the rule change. As a result of the change, smaller firms have a mechanism to control perquisite consumption that didn't exist before. Greene, 2008) .
The Number of Perquisites
We find results that are similar to those presented in Table V . Panel A of Table VI presents results for the number of perquisite items awarded to the CEO. The coefficient on Efficiency is consistently positive and significant at conventional levels, indicating that efficient managers enjoy a greater number of perquisites. GIM is positively and significantly associated with the number of perquisite items. Mgmt own is negatively associated with the number of perquisites, albeit at slightly more elevated test levels. Similar to the results in Table V , Mkt size and Entry cost have a positive and statistically significant association with the number of perquisites. Overall, the results presented in Table VI are generally consistent with the results presented in Table V .
One important exception between Tables V and VI is the evidence that managerial ownership has a negative influence on the number of perquisites consumed.
In summary, the number of perquisites awarded increases as overall governance quality weakens, as the threat of product market competition decreases, and if managers have a smaller 22 ownership stake. However, the evidence also shows the duality of perquisites with them also serving as a reward for high marginal product managers.
The Types of Perquisites Consumed
In this section we examine the firm's choice to provide a perquisite of each type. We report results based upon CEO perquisite consumption only for brevity. A binary dependent variable is defined for each perquisite type. We estimate a probit specification for each perquisite type (Greene, 2008) .
19 Table VII In summary, we examine three alternative but complimentary measures of perquisite consumption: 1) the dollar value of perquisites, 2) the number of different perquisites, and 3) the types of perquisites. Each measure serves as an indicator of perquisite consumption. Based on the results of our empirical analysis we find results that suggest firms with weak governance, which is a sign of agency problems, award more perquisites. We also find results that support the contention that perquisites are an award for managerial productivity. This suggests a dual role for 23 perquisites. On one end of the spectrum, perquisite awards serve as a reward for productivity and on the other end they are a precursor to agency problems. We find no support for our free cash flow, abnormal compensation, intangible intensity or tax alternative explanations for perquisite consumption.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The issue of whether perquisite awards reflect an agency problem or are provided to reward high marginal product managers is an open question in the accounting literature. The studies of
Yermack (2006) and Rajan and Wulf (2006) reach different conclusions on the matter.
Collectively, the results from this study show a consistent pattern of results. The results indicate that weak internal governance quality, weak product market competition, low managerial ownership and institutional ownership are associated with perquisite consumption, whether measured in dollars or number of perquisites awarded. Larger more complex companies (companies with more business segments) also award more perquisites, consistent with the presence of agency problems, but these results are also consistent with large firms hiring and rewarding high marginal product managers. We also find evidence that firms characterized by greater managerial efficiency award greater perquisites, consistent with the hypotheses that perquisites enhance productivity. Hence we conclude that there is a duality associated with perquisite awards depending on the organization. As a result, neither the agency hypothesis of perquisites indicating managerial abuse of privilege, nor the hypothesis that perquisites are solely the product of reward for productivity can individually explain the data, rather both hypotheses taken together explain the seemingly disparate results in the literature.
A limitation of our study is our focus on the time period immediately after the rule change, Roughly three percent of the firms in our sample decided to change their perquisite program, following institution of the new SEC reporting rule. Unfortunately, the sample of changes is far too small for us at this time to make meaningful statements about the factors driving these choices, we do observe a pattern of negative revaluations (not reported) for these cases and that firms with high CEO compensation prior to the institution of the new SEC rules did tend to change policies. • Personal use company aircraft -Expenses from the use of a company owned or leased aircraft by an executive or the family/friends of the executive.
• Air travel allowance -Any expenses from air travel that are not the result of the executive using a company owned or leased aircraft. This would include such items as commercial airplane tickets.
• Other long-distance travel -This includes all of the costs associated with executive long distance travel-hotels and lodging away from home as well as the expenses associated with spouse and family accompanying the executive.
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Company car & local transportationIncludes expenses associated with car and local transportation.
• Transportation allowance -This includes automobile insurance paid by the company, as well as gas and parking.
• Use of company automobile -This category includes the personal use of a company owned or leased automobile by the executive.
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Entertainment and other extra-curricular activities -Includes all entertainment and extracurricular activity expenses, including country club and dining privileges.
• Payments to clubs for membership dues, fees, and initiation --Includes health, lunch country and airway clubs. This category also includes alcohol, meal discounts and allowances at nice restaurants.
• Vacation expenses and vacation payouts -This includes payments for executive vacation and retreats. Entails items such as travel vouchers. Payouts for vacations not used by executives also fall under this category, as does holiday pay.
• Sporting and other entertainment events and expenses related to those events -This would include the cost of tickets.
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Personal and Family Related Perquisites that enhance home/family situation of the executive
• Security -This entails personal and home security paid for by the corporation for the executive.
• Housing allowances -This category encompasses all payments made by the corporation for housing, whether it be temporary or permanent, and any payments for home maintenance, home improvement, or utilities.
• Moving and Relocation -This category is for compensation to executives for moving, relocating. This includes payments to previous employers for moving to the company, foreign service premiums, and any expatriate payments.
• Education expenses paid for by the corporation -This includes all education expenses for the executive and the family. This would entail items like college tuition and an "education allowance".
5
Equity related perquisites not included in stock options or other equity compensation
• Encompasses any dividends and stock distributed to the executive, as well as any special plans for the executive to purchase stock.
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Legal, Financial, and Tax Services
• Legal fees -Any payments made by the corporation for legal fees or services incurred by the executive. • Financial and tax planning services -Corporation payments for financial and tax planning services.
• Tax payments & tax gross-ups -This category includes all tax payments and gross-ups for the executive, with no attention given to the item being grossed up. Designed to measure the amount of taxes paid by the corporation for the executive.
